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Abstract
Priority setting in health care is ubiquitous and health authorities are increasingly 
recognising the need for priority setting guidelines to ensure efficient, fair, and 
equitable resource allocation. While cost-effectiveness concerns seem to dominate 
many policies, the tension between utilitarian and deontological concerns is salient 
to many, and various severity criteria appear to fill this gap. Severity, then, must be 
subjected to rigorous ethical and philosophical analysis. Here we first give a brief 
history of the path to today’s severity criteria in Norway and Sweden. The Scandi-
navian perspective on severity might be conducive to the international discussion, 
given its long-standing use as a priority setting criterion, despite having reached 
rather different conclusions so far. We then argue that severity can be viewed as a 
multidimensional concept, drawing on accounts of need, urgency, fairness, duty to 
save lives, and human dignity. Such concerns will often be relative to local mores, 
and the weighting placed on the various dimensions cannot be expected to be fixed. 
Thirdly, we present what we think are the most pertinent questions to answer about 
severity in order to facilitate decision making in the coming years of increased scar-
city, and to further the understanding of underlying assumptions and values that go 
into these decisions. We conclude that severity is poorly understood, and that the 
topic needs substantial further inquiry; thus we hope this article may set a challeng-
ing and important research agenda.
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Introduction
Priority setting in health care is ubiquitous and inevitable. Broadly, priority setting 
in health care can be understood as any mechanism, formal or informal, which delib-
erates between the possible uses of available resources. Priority setting takes place 
from the bed-side-level to decisions at the national level [2, 36, 47, 55, 67, 73, 83, 
93, 124].
The literature on priority setting criteria—a crucial ingredient of real-world pri-
ority setting—and their ethical underpinnings is as rich as it is diverse. Ethicists, 
health care professionals, economists, and policy makers have all contributed to 
the debate on suitable principles for priority setting in health care. Arguments from 
utilitarian, egalitarian, and prioritarian camps, among others, have been advanced 
but no thorough consensus seems to exist [14, 15, 19, 22, 27, 33, 34, 39, 44, 51, 57, 
64, 65, 72, 76, 81, 89, 95, 96, 102, 103, 115, 116, 119–121]. Moreover, the lack of 
attention to underlying values has given a false impression that there exist value-
neutral methods and techniques to inform priority setting [45, 50, 122].
Recent studies investigating values behind policies and methods have disclosed 
a greater diversity of priority setting principles and criteria across countries than 
expected [8, 15, 58]. Safety, efficiency, cost, and budgetary constraints together con-
stitute classical cost-effectiveness, which in priority setting ethics is built upon utili-
tarian considerations. In Norway and Sweden, however, considerable efforts have 
been made to integrate non-utilitarian ethical principles into the nations’ priority 
setting policies, and we will briefly recount the work of the past decades below.
A common concern in both Norway and Sweden—and elsewhere—is how to 
accommodate a perceived obligation to prioritise those with severe conditions. Both 
general and more specific severity criteria have been suggested and implemented 
within these nations’ publicly funded health care systems.1 Indeed, severity has been 
paramount in the development of official priority setting guidelines and legislation 
in Norway and Sweden. On the surface, these criteria appear to be fairly uncontro-
versial and widely accepted as relevant and legitimate. We will argue in this article 
that severity—qua priority setting criteria—is, in fact, controversial when operation-
alised, ethically ambiguous, and that it is likely that there exist irreconcilable views 
about when and to what extent a condition is severe. Hence, there is a need for more 
research within the area of severity. A key ingredient in this research activity on 
severity will be to highlight the controversies: exactly what is unknown or contro-
versial? The aim of this article is to set a research agenda from the interdisciplinary 
perspective of scholars engaged in priority setting research, focusing on severity. 
Although the questions posed below can be seen as mainly philosophical, answer-
ing them has implications for other areas, e.g. health economics. Hence, input from 
these other areas is likely to be fruitful, especially when it comes to concrete issues 
such as measuring severity. Against this background, the authors represent several 
different disciplines.
1 Both Norway and Sweden are generally acknowledged to have fairly extensive universal health care 
(UHC) systems, although particularly illegal immigrants are known to suffer from poor access to basic 
health care [68, 79].
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We will argue that the concept of severity can be viewed as a multidimensional 
concept, drawing up research questions related to concepts like need, urgency, fair-
ness, social consequences, mortality versus morbidity, and human dignity. At the 
same time, a Scandinavian perspective on severity might be conducive to advancing 
the international discussion, given its long-standing use as a priority setting crite-
rion in Norway and Sweden. This is despite having reached rather different con-
clusions—and hence they currently use different formal priority setting criteria (see 
next section). Since different accounts of severity are, in fact, prevalent in different 
jurisdictions, these diverse accounts need to be explicitly recognised and deliber-
ated. Otherwise, we believe that the long-term legitimacy of official priority setting 
policy may be compromised. This concern builds on a literature of the role of the 
social contract in health care policy, originating with John Rawls and Norman Dan-
iels [20, 21, 86], but also more recent research on the need for legitimacy in priority 
setting [15, 30, 91, 95, 122]. It may be prudent, therefore, to analyse severity both 
as an essentially contested concept [16, 32], and severity as (at least temporary) a 
basis for incompletely theorized agreements [92, 113]. Considering the framework 
of essentially contested concepts may serve to highlight that the labelling of a con-
dition as severe may serve as a mechanism though which a claim of higher priority 
is mediated; suggesting that (sometimes) severity is a relative concept. The theory 
behind incompletely theorized agreements promises a rich framework for analysing 
at what level disagreements on definitions of severity occur: Do agents disagree on 
fundamental ethics and background theories? Do they diverge on mid-level prin-
ciples for operationalising severity, or is it the classification of specific cases into 
agreed-upon abstract categories that causes tensions? Severity matters to people, it 
seems. In this paper we highlight a number of points of disagreement on how and 
why.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: first we give a brief history 
of the current severity criteria in Norway and Sweden. Next, we give a rudimen-
tary taxonomy of the identified ethical principles and concerns forming the basis 
of the severity criterion in the two countries. Thirdly, we present what we think are 
the most pertinent questions to answer regarding severity, in order to facilitate deci-
sion making in the context of increased scarcity, and to further the understanding of 
underlying assumptions and values that go into these decisions.
A Brief Account of the History of Severity as a Priority Setting 
Criterion on the Scandinavian Peninsula
Historically, public health services developed largely in parallel in Norway and Swe-
den. A comprehensive welfare state was introduced in the period following the Sec-
ond World War. Both countries have comprehensive publicly funded health care sys-
tems. The total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP has grown steadily from 
about 1% in 1945 to around 10% today. Both nations recognised an urgent need to 
ration health care, and set up formal priority setting guidelines, starting in the early 
1970s, after two decades of rapid growth of services and health budgets [99, 112].
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It seems unfeasible to design a priority setting framework intended to curb unsus-
tainable growth of health care expenditure without including some measure of cost-
effectiveness. Both nations have de facto incorporated a cost-effectiveness principle 
as part of the backbone of priority setting guidelines. With regard to the meas-
urement of effectiveness, over the last two decades the quality-adjusted life year 
(QALY) has become the canonical outcome measure for health technology assess-
ment. The QALY is a preference based outcome measure integrating morbidity and 
mortality [118]. However, there seems to be a broad consensus among the public, 
politicians, health professionals and bureaucrats that cost-effectiveness alone does 
not capture all the salient attributes of illness and disease relevant to public priority 
setting, and that there are more to be said before fair and morally acceptable prior-
ity setting can be carried out. Particularly, the idea that an intervention or a treat-
ment targeting patients with particularly severe conditions ought to be prioritised 
above treatment targeting patients with less severe health conditions, despite being 
less cost-efficient, has broad support in policy and among health care personnel and 
the citizens [29, 105]. Both Norway and Sweden have therefore included a severity 
criterion. How the severity criteria are being interpreted and implemented, however, 
are rather different.
Severity in Norway
The first parliamentary committee concerned explicitly with priority setting in 
Norway, was the first Lønning commission in 1987 (Lønning I). As public health 
expenditure expanded rapidly from 1960 to 1980, previous commissions had already 
considered various aspects of rationing [61, 100], but Lønning I was the first com-
prehensive public inquiry into when and how rationing of health care could be car-
ried out. In the resulting white paper (NOU)2 [59], a very thorough discussion of 
priority setting in health care is given, and several criteria are discussed. The com-
mission’s mandate included analysing the de facto practices for priority setting in 
the Norwegian health care system, and—if found to be acceptable—to build upon 
these. To this end, Lønning I identified degree of severity, egalitarianism, waiting 
time, and cost-effectiveness as “relevant dimensions” for priority setting.
It might seem odd to identify waiting time as a criterion of priority setting; sys-
tematically making patients wait for indicated treatment is probably better under-
stood as a mechanism for addressing more urgent needs first, for securing equal-
ity of access, and to some extent to ensure that expectant management is attempted 
before more costly treatment options are employed. That is, waiting lists are best 
understood as a priority setting tool. The discussion by Lønning I of waiting time in 
the health services highlights that patient’s wait for different reasons, and that while 
delayed treatment might be unacceptable for some, it is a reasonable rationing mech-
anism for others [59, pp. 77–78]. Lønning I also finds that egalitarianism, phrased 
2 In Norway, a white paper summing up the reasoning and conclusions of a governmental committee 
deliberating on a topic is referred toa s an NOU (Norsk Offentlig Utredning). The equivalent term for 
Swedish white papers is SOU (Statens offentliga utredningar).
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as universal and equitable access to sufficient health care for the attainment of one’s 
“health potential” should remain an important principle of Norwegian health ser-
vices. Nevertheless, it is severity that the commission considers the paramount 
parameter for priority setting, and severity is consistently linked with the concepts 
of need, urgency, (risk of) death, and suffering. Cost-effectiveness is also considered 
important in Lønning I, but, it seems, subordinate to the severity criterion.
Lønning II appeared in 1997 [60], and was the second parliamentary committee 
on general priority setting criteria3 for the Norwegian health services. The mandate 
for Lønning II explicitly called for an operationalisation of the principles from Løn-
ning I, including the aim of making them applicable also to individual patients.
It is clear that Lønning II considers that integrating cost-effectiveness and the 
severity criterion is inherently threatened by the conflict between consequentialist 
and deontological ethics. The resolution of this dilemma is not carried out, and Løn-
ning II recommends rather vaguely that human dignity must be the loadstar of prior-
ity setting, recommending that the different medical specialities must deliberate and 
decide how exactly severity is applied to their patients. Equity in health was consid-
ered to be subsumed by these principles [88].
In 2014 the Norheim commission completed the third NOU on priority setting—
Transparent and fair [74]. This commission’s work upheld the focus on cost-effective-
ness, but suggested a radical re-interpretation of severity and health equity. The health 
loss criterion—building on lifetime-prioritarianism—was proposed as sufficient for 
dealing with the severity issue [70, 72, 81, 82]. The ensuing debate was dismissive [7, 
35, 52, 69, 71, 75, 80], and a second commission, led by Jon Magnussen, was appointed 
to reassess the severity criterion. The Magnussen report was submitted in 2015 [62], in 
which absolute shortfall was proposed as a better alternative to Norheim’s health loss 
criterion. Under the health loss criterion, a life-time prioritarian account is employed 
[82]. A condition’s severity is quantified by the number of life-time QALYs—consider-
ing both the past and the future—that an individual stand to lose, relative to a norm of 
80 QALYs. This results in a priority setting criterion with a strong redistributive com-
ponent. The absolute shortfall criterion differs in two important ways: it does not con-
sider the past, but only considers the expected future QALY loss. Secondly, it does not 
assume a norm of 80 QALYs, but instead computes the gap to the age-specific expected 
number of remaining QALYs for an individual in good health. The absolute shortfall 
thus retains a redistributive aspect, but somewhat less pronounced, and no longer retro-
spectively. Both have in common that the QALY is the sole numeraire for severity.
An important feature of the Norheim-Magnussen debate is that, despite acknowl-
edging that severity is ambiguous and multifaceted, the impact they had on official 
documents and priority setting debate was to highlight QALY-based measures of 
severity as the standard and to relegate other concerns to the periphery of the debate 
[77, 90]. Very simplified, we could say that Norheim’s health loss integrated severity 
3 Note that two other commissions—Grundt (remuneration for pharmacological expenses) and Steine 
(hospital management principles)—handed over NOUs in 1997, and these commissions’ reports display 
substantial overlap in arguments and conclusions [38, 110]. For example, all three reports reproduce the 
same figure for an illustration of what has later become known as the “health gap”—the discrepancy 
between the technical and the financial constraints on treatment options.
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and inequity and that Magnussen’s absolute shortfall fix to this (perceived) problem, 
largely deposed non-QALY concerns from consideration.
In 2018, another commission—the Blankholm commission—submitted yet 
another NOU: The most important first (Det viktigste først) [9]. This NOU discusses 
priority setting for municipal services, and largely concurs with Magnussen’s report 
on the issue of severity. However, an important deviation is implied by questioning 
the applicability of the QALY for non-specialist services—epitomised by the term 
mastery as an independent goal for treatment. The Norwegian term employed—
‘mestring’—is perhaps better translated as coping, although coping here does not 
quite capture the full connotations of the Norwegian ‘mestring’, which suggests get-
ting ‘on top of’ (e.g. capability to meet social roles, conduct activities of daily life, 
and find meaning and dignity.) rather than merely ‘getting by’. ‘Self-management’ is 
also a candidate term. Secondly, the Blankholm commission insists that a notion of 
basic needs should be defined and take precedence over severity (and equity) con-
cerns in a priority setting context. The report goes as far as stating that covering 
these—still to be defined—basic needs should not be subject to cost-effectiveness 
constraints.
Severity in Sweden
In Sweden a parliamentary committee on priority setting in health-care was estab-
lished in 1992, resulting in a white paper in 1995 and in legislation in 1997 propos-
ing three principles for priority setting: The Human Dignity Principle, the Need-
Solidarity Principle, and the Cost-Effectiveness Principle [28, 87, 104, 105].
The Human Dignity Principle is the overriding ethical principle and addresses 
personal characteristics and functions in society that should not impact on prior-
ity setting (and therefore should not impact the assessment of severity), e.g., talent, 
social position, responsibility, income, chronological age, and gender. The concept 
of ‘need’ in the Needs-Solidarity principle is defined in terms of providing more 
resources to patients with the more severe diseases, but also worse quality of life, 
seemingly making a distinction between severe disease and bad quality of life. It is 
claimed that the care of severe disease and substantial quality of life decline should 
be prioritised before mild conditions, even if the former care is substantially less 
cost effective. Later in the white paper it is argued that a patient’s need is likely to 
depend both on the severity of the disease but also the duration of disease—seem-
ingly making a distinction between current severity and duration.
It is claimed that a disease can vary in severity over time even for patients with 
chronic ill health conditions. It is also claimed that severity can be judged according 
to the suffering of the patient, the medical prognosis, the disability, and the existen-
tial despair experienced. In a later operationalisation by several central actors in the 
Swedish health-care system of the needs-solidarity principle, all of these different 
considerations were in some way subsumed under the concept of severity of a condi-
tion [85].
Moreover, severity has come to play an essential role in determining which treat-
ments are subsidised by the Swedish pharmaceutical and benefits system (TLV), i.e. 
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that which society pays for rather than the patient herself. More specifically, dif-
ferent thresholds of cost-effectiveness are considered acceptable depending on the 
degree of severity. For example, during the last few years, decisions indicate that a 
threshold of 1,000,000 SEK/QALY is accepted for conditions considered to have the 
highest degree of severity, 750,000 SEK/QALY for severe conditions, 500,000 SEK 
for conditions of moderate degree, and a similar decrement to the lowest degree. At 
present there are, however, different approaches to assessing severity in the Swed-
ish health-care system, causing potential inconsistencies. Nonetheless, the policy of 
TLV is clearly different from the absolute shortfall policy of Norway: in Sweden 
severity is not measured using shortfall in terms of QALYs. At least not consist-
ently. The Human Dignity Principle and its ban on taking chronological age into 
account has generally been interpreted as an obstacle to adopting an absolute short-
fall approach to severity.
Remaining Questions About Severity
There are numerous accounts of severity, as demonstrated by our overview of the 
Norwegian and Swedish discourses. A need to further clarify which basic moral 
considerations that should be involved is needed. However, no matter how impor-
tant such activities are, deciding upon overarching considerations is not sufficient. 
To provide guidance, such considerations need to be specific, enabling them to be 
implemented in real world priority setting situations. Clarity regarding normative 
basis, as well as precision regarding practical implications, are two desirable traits 
of an account of severity. In order to achieve that, a set of questions about severity 
needs to be addressed.
The two most fundamental questions that need to be answered are: what is sever-
ity and why does it matter? Of course, it is difficult to see how the first answer could 
be answered without at least a tentative answer to the second one. However, the first 
Table 1  Questions regarding severity
What is severity? Why does severity matter?
Is severity dependent on individual desires? Is severity an absolute or a relative concept?
What is the relationship between (subjective) well-
being and severity?
Can severity be aggregated?
How should severity be assessed when patients suf-
fer from more than one condition?
How does severity relate to considerations of 
equality?
How should severity be viewed from a temporal 
perspective?
How does severity relate to urgency and need?
What is the relationship between age and severity?
Is death an independent dimension of severity?
Is severity related to an individual’s social context?
What is the relationship between severity and 
prevention?
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question is essentially about what aspects or factors that should be included in an 
account of severity while the second refers to the feasibility and desirability of com-
paring different states of severity. Exploring these two main questions leads us to a 
number of sub-questions (see Table 1). Let us elaborate. 
Question I About Severity: What is Severity?
Let us start with the first question: what is severity? Perhaps the most important 
thing to determine when answering this question is which aspects should be taken 
into account when determining severity. As we have already seen from the Swedish 
and Norwegian cases, several suggestions exist for how to do this.
The Swedish white paper suggested that the suffering of the patient, the medi-
cal prognosis, the disability, and the existential despair experienced were all part of 
determining the level of severity [28]. At least, it was made clear that both health 
and quality of life mattered. Of course, whenever suggesting that more than one fac-
tor determines something, it is desirable to suggest the relative weight of these fac-
tors. Moreover, if one is referring to something as contested as quality of life and 
health, these concepts need to be understood unequivocally.
In Norway, a more well-defined but narrow understanding of the aspects deter-
mining severity has been adopted. In brief, the idea has been to understand severity 
and effect in the same terms: as quality adjusted life years (see above). Severity is 
quantified by some standard health economic measure, such as the preferences peo-
ple express towards different health states as formalised by, for example, an EQ-5D 
questionnaire. Such measurements are usually considered to capture some notion of 
health-related quality of life [49]. But any such notion necessarily takes a stand on 
what is ultimately important for an individual, i.e. quality of life, and no such idea is 
uncontroversial [46]. Furthermore, the Norwegian take on severity presuppose that 
advantages (effect) and disadvantages (severity) should be understood in the same 
terms, which is by no means self-evident.
Is Severity Dependent on Individual Desires?
One issue is whether the severity of a condition may depend on individual desires 
or preferences, or if severity is something which applies to a medical condition 
independent of the perceptions of the patient’s attitudes towards her condition. For 
example, the severity of infertility seems to depend on whether there is a desire for 
having children or not; if the individual has no desire of having biologically related 
children whatsoever, it is highly unlikely that the individual in question will perceive 
the condition of infertility as severe and unclear why anyone else should consider it 
so. It seems plausible to consider desires relevant for determining severity, at least 
sometimes and to some degree. But: when and how much? Moreover, will severity 
also depend on the strength of such a desire? This takes us to the general point about 
the relationship between subjective well-being and severity [42, 97].
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What is the Relationship Between (Subjective) Well‑Being and Severity?
The seminal papers Subjective well-being and The Satisfaction with Life Scale by 
Ed Diener et al. have spawned a large literature with branches in psychology, phi-
losophy, and economics. An important question for an account of severity for prior-
ity setting purposes is if and how it should incorporate subjective well-being [11, 
23–26, 31, 78, 94, 114, 117]. We believe that a general sentiment among priority 
setting scholars is that without a clear idea of the problems arising from managing 
the gap between ‘objective’ health and ‘subjective’ well-being, policies risk coming 
into conflict with ethical ideals. For example, placing too much emphasis on subjec-
tive evaluation of one’s own health may discriminate against those who adapt well, 
or are endowed with a naturally positive disposition, while ‘objective measures of 
health’ may not measure what people in fact care about. Of course, such problems 
also concern the use of any preference based measure (e.g. QALYs).
Should it Be the Disease or the Condition of the Patient that is Assessed?
In the Swedish context, there has been a shift from talking in terms of severity of 
disease towards discussing severity of ill health condition. The Swedish 1996 white 
paper about priorities in Sweden, stated that “[t]he diagnosis or disease is not impor-
tant, the decisive issue is instead the condition at every particular time of need of 
health care” [87]. However, in the international discussion, both concepts are used. 
If the severity of disease assesses the disease regardless of treatment status, and the 
severity of a condition is sensitive to whether the condition has been treated or not, 
this may have a major impact on priority setting decisions, e.g. in situations where 
there is ample access to treatments reducing the severity of the disease [98].
How Should Severity be Assessed When Patients Suffer from More than One 
Condition?
Normally, when severity is applied as a priority setting criterion in the Swedish 
or Norwegian systems, a specific condition is assessed (for instance, chronic heart 
failure with a specific NYHA level, prostate cancer at a specific stage etc.) in rela-
tion to a potential treatment targeting that condition (so-called condition-treatment 
pairs). This approach means that when severity is taken into account as a criterion 
for priority setting it is employed as the extent to which patients are badly off with 
respect to the condition that is targeted by the treatment (condition-specific sever-
ity). While there may be several practical reasons for this approach it is not clear 
whether it accounts for the morally relevant sense of being worse off. One alterna-
tive is to assess severity as the extent to which the patient is worse off when all of 
the patient’s conditions are considered [41]. However, this approach has a number of 
practical difficulties and it remains to be seen how plausible this approach is when 
related to other relevant criteria for priority setting. Moreover, some treatments tar-
get side-effects of a disease or treatment, for example managing nausea following 
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chemotherapy. Does this mean that only the severity of nausea should be assessed 
or that the severity of the underlying cause of the nausea (in this case cancer) should 
also be considered? Or, if the patient suffers from both cancer and diabetes type II—
should both conditions be taken into account in the assessment of severity—even if 
treatment only targets one of these conditions?
How Should Severity be Viewed from a Temporal Perspective?
In a priority setting context, it is essential to have a clear idea of how a severity cri-
terion applies to a condition over the course of treatment. Many conditions lead to 
prolonged treatment paths involving several treatment options at different times. It is 
important to establish whether the severity of a condition is subject to reassessment 
throughout the course of the disease. Another aspect of this is that if the severity of 
a condition approach is used, then treatment will affect the severity of the condition 
[98]. This implies that the order in which treatment are introduced might affect the 
actual prioritisation. For example, say we have two treatments A and B where A has 
a moderate effect but only has an acceptable level of cost-effectiveness if targeting a 
highly severe condition and B has a moderate effect but is acceptable even if target-
ing mildly severe conditions. If we consider a patient with a very severe disease, if 
the patient is given B first, the patient will not get access to A, since that is no longer 
acceptable given that the patient’s severity is now reduced. If, on the other hand, the 
patient is first given A, both treatments would be acceptable.
Another manifestation of how a temporal dimension of severity makes a differ-
ence is contained in the discussion of health loss versus absolute shortfall above: are 
certain life-times ‘severe’, or are certain futures ‘severe’. The latter view is forward-
looking, and would not take into account for how long one has already suffered from 
a condition when determining severity. The first view is explicitly backward-look-
ing, and holds that the past should be considered relevant for priority setting. Life-
time prioritarianism, proposed by Norheim et al. in Norway, does accommodate the 
past [74, 81, 82]. Presently, both the Norwegian—after Magnussen’s report [62]—
and the Swedish policy seem to reject the backward-looking view.
What is the Relationship Between Age and Severity?
The problems related to age when using utility-like measures for health outcomes 
(QALY) and burden of disease (DALY) are well-known. As discussed above, there 
have been concerns that the hitherto proposed severity criteria in Norway and Swe-
den discriminate against the elderly. It is perhaps fair to say that any severity crite-
rion that implicitly incorporates a shortfall of QALYs (or similar measures) must, to 
some extent, give lower priority to predominantly elderly patients as long as human 
longevity remains naturally bounded above. The question, then, is if this age-dis-
crimination is a necessary consequence of those accounts of severity that is ethi-
cally defensible and which the public is willing to accept as legitimate. Moreover, 
should it be viewed as a case of age-discrimination (given that the chosen defini-
tion disadvantages those of advanced age)? Alternatively, severity must be described 
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independently of QALY outcomes, in a manner that does not favour treatments that 
target younger patient groups [3, 12, 56, 66, 72, 81, 89, 118].
Is Death an Independent Dimension of Severity?
Related to the former question is the question about severity and end-of-life con-
cerns. There is a rich literature on priority setting in conjunction with end-of-life 
treatment, which suggests that many consider imminent death as an especially 
severe condition. However, it is also possible that the two issues—demise and severe 
conditions—have been inappropriately conflated. It is a mere observation that many 
conditions that lead to an early death are characterised as severe, but it is equally 
clear that there are non-fatal severe conditions. Furthermore, there is empirical evi-
dence to the effect that the general public evaluates health differently when the pros-
pect of death is salient, which indicates that death and severity are closely related, 
but not interchangeable [4, 5, 13, 17, 43, 63, 84, 101, 106–109, 125].
Is Severity Related to an Individual’s Social Context?
Is the social context of the individual a dimension of severity? In the early years of 
the GBD’s DALY measure, explicit modelling of social context was included. If a 
caregiver suffers from a condition, his family or people close to him will most likely 
be affected in different ways. For example, the (now abandoned) age-weighting of 
the DALY attributed greater weight to illness and dysfunction during the reproduc-
tive years. Normally, in health-care we find that there is some form of obligations 
on health care providers also towards family or significant others. Are these obli-
gations an indication for taking into account the effect on significant others’ well-
being when assessing the severity of a patients’ condition, or vice versa, how the 
well-being of significant others affect the patient? Is it worse if the health condition 
also substantially affects other people, as is the case with e.g., dementia, psychiatric 
disease, or with young children? Conversely, is the medical condition less severe for 
the patient, when care and support from family and significant others are in place? 
In particular, if a shift towards more holistic approaches to well-being is advocated, 
these are important issues [1, 123]. Both the Swedish and the Norwegian policies 
seem to reject social context: the Swedish by explicitly rejecting this in its Human 
Dignity Principle, and the Norwegian by its general lack of focus on non-QALY 
measurable dimensions. However, the focus on the slightly indeterminate ‘mastery’ 
from the recent Blankholm NOU might change this in the coming years.
What is the Relationship Between Severity and Prevention?
Can a non-severe condition be urgent because it will, in a near or more prolonged 
perspective, become severe untreated? A slight wound from a rabies infected dog is 
severe in the sense that if post-exposure prophylaxis is not administered, a fatal out-
come is almost certain. Nevertheless, a dog-bite is often considered relatively minor 
in itself. Conversely, a condition leading to slight, but permanent, dysfunction could 
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reasonably be considered urgent if expedient treatment could restore full function; 
severe, however, seems an unfit label. Or is the condition already inherently severe if 
urgent measures are needed?
How does the interplay between need, urgency and severity affect how we think 
about preventive measures, like vaccination programs, in priority setting contexts? 
In the preventive situation, we are treating a group in order for a small number of 
potential patients to have a benefit. When assessing severity, should the level of risk 
of developing the targeted condition be taken into account? In the Swedish context, 
the severity criterion has been recommended for use in assessment of preventive 
programmes by assessing the severity of the targeted condition once developed, and 
then lowering the severity somewhat given the level of risk to develop this condition 
[85]. In the Norwegian context, the severity of the condition in a preventive situation 
focuses on those individuals who will benefit from prevention, i.e., the severity of 
the condition avoided.
Question II About Severity: Why Does Severity Matter?
Let us turn to the second general question: why is severity important to consider 
when prioritising in health care? There are at least two basic moral ideas that can 
buttress the importance of severity. First, we have the idea that being bad (or worse, 
or worst) off is morally important in itself and gives rise to special entitlements of 
receiving assistance from others. This kind of fundamental moral intuition (that can 
be labelled “the moral importance of evil”) is expressed in a multitude of specific 
ideas about just distribution. One is so-called prioritarianism, that says benefiting 
someone matters more the worse off that someone is (absolutely and not relative to 
others then). As mentioned, this view was presupposed in Norheim’s report [88]. 
Another version of the idea is sufficientarianism, saying that we are entitled to ben-
efit when we are worse off than a pre-defined threshold of, say, health. Yet another is 
the Rawlsian difference principle, saying that we should make the worst off as well 
off as possible [48].
The other basic moral idea that may serve as a rationale for caring about severity 
is (comparative) egalitarianism, e.g. the idea that it is bad for oneself to be worse 
off than someone else, at least if it is of no fault of one’s own (so-called telic egali-
tarianism) [48]. That is to say, inequalities are intrinsically bad. This idea seems to 
be suggested in both the Norwegian and Swedish policies, but it is unclear what the 
connection is between egalitarian concerns and severity—see below. One suggestion 
is that severity matters because having a severe condition usually means that one is 
worse off than others and that we then have a moral reason to remedy this from the 
point of view of egalitarianism.
Is Severity an Absolute or a Relative Concept?
A condition or a disease, it seems, is always severe in relation to something non-
severe, say a normal, healthy state of existence. But apart from that, should the 
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degree of severity be determined only (or foremost) in relation to how badly off one 
is in relation to others or should it be determined on a person-independent scale 
that in principle could be applied to any isolated individual (or condition)? That is, 
should “worse-offness” (so to speak) be considered relative to other individuals or in 
an absolute sense (in terms of how badly off one is regardless of others’ well-being)? 
The answer to this question turns on the answer to what the ultimate rationale of 
severity is, where the relative account seems to be the one favoured by egalitarians 
and the absolute account by those who view severity as founded on some idea about 
the moral weight of evil [43].
Can Severity be Aggregated?
One question that an account of severity needs to address is the extent to which, one 
should consider severity as amenable to interpersonal aggregation. For instance, let 
us assume that we are considering distributing health care resources to one of two 
treatments to two separate groups of patients, A and B. Either, we can benefit A or 
B, but not both. Let us assume that those in group A suffer from a condition that is 
more severe than in group B and, consequently, that those in group B suffer from a 
less severe condition, but a condition that still is severe (or so we assume). Let us 
furthermore assume that the number of individuals in group A is smaller than in 
group B. Should we account for severity in such a way that it allows us to add up 
‘severities’ in the respective groups so that the ‘total amount of severity’ in group 
B outweighs the total amount of severity in group A (even though all individuals 
in group A have more severe conditions than all individuals in group B)? In other 
words, should we consider severity as something that we can aggregate or not?
The answer to this question must hinge on the rationale behind caring about 
severity, i.e., the answer to the question: why does severity matter? If the answer is 
of a prioritarian kind, the answer seems to be yes, since prioritarianism allows all 
sorts of value comparison as long as weights are attached on being worse off [48]. 
On the other hand, if the answer is of a Rawlsian kind, the answer seems to be no, 
since the difference principle gives absolute priority to the worst off, regardless of 
the size of benefits to others [54]. This also seem to resonate with an account of 
severity which considers not having basic needs met—as alluded to by the Blank-
holm NOU—as severe; meeting basic needs of even one person could then com-
promise the needs of a myriad others. In fact, such an account seems to induce a 
non-Archimedean priority-ordering, where interventions targeting basic needs are 
incommensurably more important than others [37, 108].
How do Severity and Equity Relate?
In particular, the Norwegian debate has been influenced strongly by prioritarianism 
though Norheim’s NOU, and its ethical heritage [6, 10, 20, 36, 53, 73, 74, 81, 82, 
86, 111]. Very briefly, prioritarianism can be understood as a form of utilitarianism 
that incorporates some idea of equity, and is a normative and prescriptive ethical 
stance: severity is—at least in some measure—deprivation in relation to some more 
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absolute threshold. If on the other hand, the normative background theory is some 
version of egalitarianism, severity is assessed relative to how other people are situ-
ated on the severity scale.
How Does Severity Relate to Urgency and Need?
How does the notion of severity relate to other central concepts such as need and 
urgency? Some writers believe that need should be interpreted as either severity or 
capacity to benefit. It has also been suggested that a more plausible interpretation 
of a person’s needs-based claim on health care resources is dependent on both these 
aspects, namely the extent to which one is badly off as well as to what extent one 
can benefit from an intervention [18, 40]. According to this interpretation, severity 
is an attribute of one’s needs. However, a delicate issue for this proposal is to work 
out a more precise answer to how needs-based claims should relate to the trade-off 
between these two aspects.
Conclusion
In this article we have identified several crucial shortcomings of the current debate 
over the use of severity criteria in priority setting. Our list of questions should be 
seen as a work-in-progress and can be used in several ways. The obvious one is as 
an inspiration for researchers within the field of priority setting and resource allo-
cation. It can also serve as a point of departure for discussions among policymak-
ers and also as a first step in research on priority setting processes, where different 
stakeholders will be engaged in creating consensus on the most urgent issues to pay 
attention to in order to facilitate policy development, and more importantly, facili-
tate implementation.
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